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A B S T R A C T
Secondary analysis of transcripts of public dialogues on climate engineering indicates that justice
concerns are an important but as yet under-recognised dimension inﬂuencing public reactions to these
emerging techniques. This paper describes and explores justice issues raised by participants in a series of
deliberative public engagement meetings. Such justice issues included the distribution of costs and
beneﬁts across space and time; the relative power and inﬂuence of beneﬁciaries and others; and the
weakness of procedural justice measures that might protect public interests in decision making about
climate engineering. We argue that publics are mobilising diverse concepts of justice, echoing both
philosophical and practical sources. We conclude that a better understanding of conceptions of justice in
this context could assist exploration and understanding of public perceptions of and attitudes towards
climate engineering and the different technologies involved. Such detailed public engagement would
appear essential if sound, well-informed and morally justiﬁable decisions are to be made regarding
research or development of climate engineering.
ã 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Global Environmental Change
journal homepa ge: www.elsev ier .com/locate /g loe nvcha1. Introduction
Questions of justice are central to climate change, and issues of
ethics have been repeatedly raised in considerations of climate
engineering as a policy response (Gardiner, 2010; Preston, 2012;
Burns 2013). Yet questions of ethics and justice with respect to
publics remain as yet relatively unexplored, despite increasing
interest in climate engineering following the Paris climate accord
in 2015 (e.g. Nicholson and Thompson, 2016; Williamson, 2016).
This paper aims to establish whether justice implications are a
signiﬁcant factor in public reactions to climate engineering and to
consider which conceptions of justice public expressions of
concerns regarding climate engineering might reﬂect. It proceeds* Corresponding author.
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0959-3780/ã 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access articwith a brief review of justice issues as arising in climate
engineering and related literature to establish the context. After
outlining the methodology applied, the paper then turns to
examination of four justice issues prevalent in a series of
deliberative public engagement meetings (moral hazard, environ-
mental dumping, vested interests and fair procedures). Finally, we
discuss the different ways justice is expressed and underlying
conceptions are mobilized indicating important implications for
policy and fertile lines of future investigation.
2. Climate engineering and justice in the literature
Climate engineering encompasses a diverse group of emerging
technologies and techniques that seek to directly intervene in the
planetary climate system to counter or reduce the negative effects
of climate change (Royal Society, 2009; NAS, 2015a,b). It is
commonly divided into methods that reduce the warming from
incoming sunlight (solar radiation management or SRM) and
methods that remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere (carbon
dioxide removal or CDR). The deployment of SRM is highly
controversial, but CDR, on the other hand, is assumed in some form
in most decarbonisation pathways which would limit globalle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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some ethical characteristics: for example both raise serious
concerns regarding the prospect that their apparent future
availability justiﬁes continued delay to mitigation and adaptation.
Although they can raise distinctive issues for policy (NAS, 2015a,b),
this paper highlights public concerns that are largely common to
both sets of technologies.
The unevenly distributed nature over space and time of both the
impacts of climate change and the burdens of mitigation and
adaptation has strongly shaped international negotiations – most
recently at Paris – and domestic policies in many nations (Adger
et al., 2006; Pickering et al., 2012; Schlosberg, 2012). At the same
time, public responses to potential mitigation technologies such as
nuclear power and carbon capture and storage have been shaped
by environmental justice concerns such as the dumping of wastes
on vulnerable communities (Bickerstaff et al., 2013; Shrader-
Frechette, 2002; Walker, 2012; Taebi and Roeser, 2015). Given the
prominence of justice concerns related to climate change
mitigation and adaptation amongst academics and policy-makers,
we believe it is important to scrutinise the justice implications of
climate engineering as a response to climate change.
There are sound reasons to anticipate signiﬁcant justice
implications, both from the potential outcomes (intended and
unintended) and from the power and scope of the technologies
involved. Ethicists and philosophers (e.g. Gardiner, 2010) engaging
with climate engineering have raised multiple issues including
serious justice concerns as well as questions over whether the
levels of interference with – or control over – nature implied by
climate engineering are ethically acceptable and whether climate
engineering may result in new injustices, and not simply act to
mitigate the likely injustices of climate change. Gardiner (2010)
suggests climate engineering would exacerbate the ‘moral
corruption’ problem, adding to disincentives for the wealthy
current generation to take effective action. Gardiner argues that in
such situations those who have gained from business as usual will
be tempted to support partial or inadequate responses that justify
maintaining their present advantages. He suggests this is an acute
problem in climate change because of the simultaneous separation
of those responsible from those most affected in both time and
space. This results in a form of ‘moral hazard’ in which apparent
insurance against damage leads to riskier behaviour, which
typically imposes costs or risks on others (Krugman, 2009).
Preston (2012) suggests climate engineering might further
compound the injustices of climate change by adding new
uncertainties over rainfall patterns, for example, to which the
poorest are most vulnerable. In addition, Burns (2013) emphasizes
the intergenerational risks of rapid warming should a climate
engineering programme be abruptly terminated, while Smith
(2012) sees climate engineering as an unacceptable domination of
future generations by present generations.
However, as a whole, as Oldham et al. (2014) show, the climate
engineering literature is dominated by natural sciences with a
focus on assessment of the potential and practicalities of climate
engineering technologies, often using modelling techniques to
explore climatic implications. Some modellers have examined the
distribution of certain climate impacts likely to arise in the
presence of climate engineering (Irvine et al., 2010; Ricke et al.,
2010; Moreno-Cruz et al., 2012). But these modelling approaches
are in a minority, limited in their approach, and typically, and
implicitly, assume liberal utilitarian and distributional concepts of
justice – in the forms discussed by Lamont and Favor (2013) – with
simplistic portrayals of public interests and vulnerabilities in
which publics are invisible, or at best imagined (Walker et al.,
2010).
Justice considerations are also largely absent in the dominant
climate engineering media discourses. Content analyses of climateengineering discourses (such as Nehrlich and Jaspal, 2012; Scholte
et al., 2013; Anselm and Hansson, 2014) rarely mention justice. In
her commentary on media analyses Buck (2012) reports that “the
justice issue is seldom considered; [and] even when it was present, it
was rarely the dominant frame” (p176). McLaren (forthcoming)
suggests that the dominant discourses around climate engineering
have acted to frame justice considerations out of the debate,
through a combination of ‘post-political’ technological optimism
and catastrophic portrayals of climate change.
In contrast, justice features more strongly in the ﬁndings of
public engagement studies on climate mitigation technologies
such as carbon capture and storage (CCS) (McLaren, 2012). While
other ethical concerns such as ‘messing with nature’ have been
reported in some detail (Corner et al., 2013), questions of justice
appear occasionally in brief mentions of distributional concerns
and most often obliquely in discussions of governance and
authority. Parkhill et al. (2013) note that participants in their
dialogues raised questions about governance, accountability and
transparency, as do Bellamy et al. (2014) who note participants’
demands for informed consent. Macnaghten and Szerszynski
(2012) suggest their deliberative groups reveal a deep scepticism
about climate engineering technologies and their potentially
undemocratic nature. Wibeck et al. (2015) also note lay concerns
raised in Swedish focus groups about governance, the locus of
power, and the prospect of Southern nations being further
disadvantaged. Such reports of public deliberation, then, only
offer tantalising hints at wider justice concerns.
This paper aims to start to ﬁll this lacuna – the lack of systematic
exploration of the dimensions of justice related to climate
engineering, as articulated or intimated by various publics –
through a secondary analysis of a series of public deliberative
events held in the UK. We seek to explore whether this gap
represents a lack of concern or salience; or is a product of ways in
which the topics were framed and discussed; or – as we believe –
that the issues are inﬂuential, yet taken for granted and rarely
directly expressed. In addition, we aim to begin to explore the
nature and sources of the issues raised and the conceptions of
justice mobilised in public deliberation.
Our identiﬁcation and analysis of justice concerns is informed
by a broad-based understanding of both scholarly and movement-
based conceptions of justice (Schlosberg, 2007; Sen, 2009; Stumpf
et al., 2015). The recognition of vulnerability, and resulting
movement-based claims of justice rooted in lived experience are
particularly signiﬁcant in environmental justice approaches
(Schlosberg, 2007; Walker, 2012). We consider justice concerns
to extend to domains of distribution, procedure and correction, and
include approaches based in human rights, capabilities, and
recognition (Caney, 2010; Honneth and Fraser, 2003; Schlosberg,
2012). Justice concerns also arise in virtue ethics, where concern
for others and for fairness is an indication of good character or a
‘virtue of justice’ (Slote, 2014). This broad understanding acknowl-
edges the prospect of diverse motivations for justice and diverse
sources of public interpretations of justice. Public interpretations
might arise from abstract philosophical theories (ranging from
egalitarian to libertarian in orientation), or from assessments of
the characteristics of the technologies or procedures under
consideration (Cotton, 2014), but in practice we might expect real
world experience and analogues, and political and social move-
ment claims to be more inﬂuential in shaping lay concepts.
Different conceptions are important inﬂuences shaping the ways in
which justice can be understood and promoted in practice.
Cosmopolitan concepts that suggest equal treatment of all people
regardless of their relatedness or proximity to us (Caney, 2010)
might recommend different practical policies than communitarian
approaches (Sandel, 2009), especially in international and
intergenerational contexts.
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question, particularly given its presence in other public debates
over emerging technologies, but also a substantive one given its
importance in negotiations over climate policy. Variations in
expressions and conceptions of justice are expected to have
signiﬁcance for formal and informal governance regimes for both
research and possible deployment of climate engineering.
3. Public engagement and methodological issues
The research value of deliberative methods is well established
particularly with respect to appraisal of novel technology
(Macnaghten et al., 2005; Pidgeon and Rogers-Hayden, 2007;
Delgado et al., 2010; Jasanoff, 2011), but also with respect to energy
and climate issues (Capstick et al., 2015; Bellamy et al., 2014; Butler
et al., 2013; Corner et al., 2013; Pidgeon et al., 2014). The ability of
deliberative methods to ‘open-up’ assessment to a wider range of
interests and considerations (Stirling, 2008; Bellamy et al., 2013) is
critical. A deliberative approach is similarly apposite for justice
considerations because they can arise in or represent a diverse
range of ethical stances (from libertarian to egalitarian), which
equally merit being ‘opened up’ for discussion. As Capstick et al.
(2015, 3–4) argue, deliberative “research can generate depth of
explanation and insight into why people have the attitudes they
do, the discourses they construct and draw upon, and the
complexity of their understanding and emotional engagement”
with the issue under discussion. As participants project their lived
experiences onto novel attitudinal objects such as imagined
futures and technologies, they also reveal the values and principles
they mobilize to consider the potential risks and consequences of
those futures.
Deliberative research is therefore important in delivering the
‘interpretive role’ of science and technology studies (Jasanoff,
2011), and offers both substantive and instrumental beneﬁts for
the governance of science and technology (Fiorino, 1990). Our
focus on justice considerations deliberately evokes the normative
purposes of engagement and technology appraisal highlighted by
both Jasanoff and Fiorino. The timing and nature of public
engagement is critical in this respect. Climate engineering has
witnessed early upstream engagement, considered to be valuable
if ﬁndings are to inﬂuence the development or regulation of a
technology prior to the emergence of path-dependency (Stirling,
2008). However, this means that the processes of engagement
themselves act to frame and deﬁne the object of deliberation,
establish particular pathways for development and also tend to
construct, craft or constitute the publics with which they engage
(Bellamy and Lezaun, 2015). Bellamy and Lezaun (2015) suggest
that early deliberation by the Royal Society (2009) and in
Experiment Earth (Ipsos MORI, 2010) helped to deﬁne climate
engineering as a coherent object and framed expectations
regarding it. They argue that to deliver both substantive and
normative purposes, subsequent work (including the deliberation
on which this paper is based) then had to seek to ‘un-frame’ and
unsettle those deﬁnitions and expectations.
The data on which this paper is based was collected as part of
the Integrated Assessment of Geoengineering Proposals (IAGP)
project, which was designed to address gaps in knowledge about
the effectiveness and side effects of geoengineering schemes. The
public dialogues were intended to enable systematic academic
study of public perceptions of climate engineering and its risks. The
project involved full-day facilitated deliberative workshops in four
UK cities (Birmingham, Cardiff, Glasgow and Norwich), in 2012,
each with eleven participants, recruited by a professional market
research agency to be broadly reﬂective of the gender, age, ethnic,
educational and socio-economic diversity of the UK and its
constituent nations. Primary analysis of the dialogues has beenpublished previously (Corner et al., 2013). This secondary analysis,
applying a new set of analytical questions regarding justice issues,
is a testimony to the richness of the deliberative process in eliciting
expression of opinions, values and challenges, despite the
relatively small number of participants. In common with all
qualitative work of this kind, no claim to statistical representa-
tiveness can be made on the basis of a sample of this size. But the
multi-layered data from small group deliberations such as this
offers an equally important analytical lens to that provided by
larger-scale (but necessarily less nuanced) quantitative studies.
Nonetheless, secondary analysis is uncommon, and not
unproblematic (Capstick et al., 2015). In this case, basing the
study upon secondary analysis arguably enables better exploita-
tion of the rich existing resource of transcribed deliberative
sessions generated within the IAGP project. The fact the data was
not explicitly collected for the purpose of an analysis of justice
considerations may even be an advantage in that the design and
implementation of the engagement process cannot have been
distorted to introduce deliberate framing effects. Although
secondary analysis typically raises a question of ‘ﬁt’ between the
data and the questions asked of it (Hammersley, 2010), in this case
the research question established by the IAGP is clearly broad
enough to encompass issues of justice and responses from publics,
and the material gathered rich enough to address them. However,
in this context, the relative absence of explicit justice issues from
the initial research design raises a risk that unconscious framings
might have been introduced by facilitators unprepared for these
issues. To help address this, facilitators’ contributions were coded
(distinctly) as part of the process, and no reasons for concern were
identiﬁed.
Secondary qualitative analysis can also raise concerns about
interpretation (Hammersley, 2010), recognising that however well
recorded or transcribed, those undertaking interviews or facilitat-
ing deliberative processes are exposed to a richer experience of
communication which can supplement – or in rare cases,
contradict – the words used, and can therefore, theoretically,
better interpret the material. This issue is not considered
signiﬁcant in the present circumstances, as most of the co-authors
on this paper were present in the deliberative sessions. Thus in the
writing and review process, there has been adequate opportunity
to identify and rectify any possible misinterpretation of participant
contributions, as well as obtaining the beneﬁts that can arise from
a detailed scrutiny of the transcripts by a new, more detached,
reader (such as the identiﬁcation of unintended framing effects).
So in this case, secondary analysis of qualitative data of this nature
is considered not only appropriate but desirable.
The original deliberative sessions were designed with consid-
eration of the need to articulate systems thinking, and to provide
balanced information and policy framings in ways that open up
spaces for reﬂection and deliberation and solicit a broad spectrum
of opinion (a philosophy towards public engagement described at
greater length in Pidgeon et al., 2014). The central approach taken
was to encourage participants to raise concerns and questions
about climate engineering, as well as reﬂecting on its potential
beneﬁts; and to constantly probe to unpack participants’ reasoning
behind their questions and concerns. Climate engineering was
discussed as a potential response to climate change, following
discussion of mitigation and adaptation. Although not constituting
as extreme an ‘unframing’ exercise as that of Macnaghten and
Szerszynski (2012) who did not even describe geoengineering as a
response to climate change, this served to reposition climate
engineering as one of a series of possible valid responses, rather
than as a singular novel approach. Four speciﬁc climate engineer-
ing techniques were described in some detail to help stimulate
discussion and to illustrate the diversity of techniques falling under
the rubric of climate engineering. These were: stratospheric
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biochar. Although the discussions mainly addressed climate
engineering in general, in the following we note when participants’
comments refer to speciﬁc technologies.
In the design and facilitation of the process, care was taken to
not introduce potentially misleading framings identiﬁed in
previous public engagement (Corner et al., 2013). However, in
the ﬁnal session of each day, a number of quotes representing
speciﬁc perspectives (selected from existing academic and grey
literature sources) were introduced to ensure that all the groups
had considered the same broad range of possible responses. The
nine statements reﬂected common academic and media framings.
These included three statements of clear relevance to justice
concerns: “Some countries will see geoengineering as an excuse to
avoid reducing their own emissions and that’s not fair”; “How do we
expect everyone to agree on something like geoengineering? If some
countries think one thing and other countries think something else
then it will just be the rich and powerful countries that get to decide”;
and, with particular respect to moral hazard: “If we could come up
with a geoengineering answer to this problem then we could carry on
ﬂying our planes and driving our cars”. In the process of analysis, we
have been careful to distinguish views raised before the introduc-
tion of this material from those that followed these prompts.
The discussion in this paper is based on qualitative thematic
analysis of the transcripts assisted by using the data management
software Atlas Ti; and in particular on an analysis of the co-
occurrence of different themes and opinions amongst the 44
participants. The coding process was focused on those aspects of
the transcripts perceived as relevant to justice, although all the
material has been closely read multiple times. Any material
expressed by the participants in terms of justice or fairness was
included, alongside material relating to justice issues identiﬁed by
philosophers and ethicists working on climate engineering, and
material that reﬂects concerns or issues raised by activists and
publics on other environmental justice topics.
In line with good practice as suggested by Friese (2014), coding
categories were primarily developed empirically from the tran-
script material, subsequently compared to theoretical concepts,
and further developed in an iterative process as recommended by
Pidgeon and Henwood (2004). Co-occurrence of different themes
and categories was assessed using the Atlas Ti co-occurrence
utility, which highlights the physical proximities of concepts in the
text, and by systematic manual checking of the identities of
speakers.
The source material is still highly relevant to current climate
policy, given renewed interest in climate engineering, and
especially CDR, following the Paris accord (Nicholson and
Thompson, 2016; Williamson, 2016) and the persistence of
justice–related disagreements over climate policy in recent years.
While our ﬁndings are drawn from UK-based public engagement,
they are of wider relevance both to other nations involved in
geoengineering research and development, and to global climate
policy. Understanding perceptions of justice in nations like the UK
is globally signiﬁcant as the UK is amongst the nations that are
understood – on philosophical grounds – to owe duties of
mitigation and compensation.
4. Justice issues identiﬁed in the dialogues
Various justice concerns were raised or endorsed in all groups
in the IAGP dialogues, by a wide range of participants. The
following sections introduce the most persistent and prevalent
concerns identiﬁed, explore how they were raised, unpack the
possible meanings, associations and motivations involved, and
identify conceptions of justice these might reﬂect. By their nature,
quotes are inevitably selective, but those presented here illustraterelevant aspects of the discussions. Typically, the selected quotes
were either not contested within the discussions, or more often,
reﬂect several participants speaking in similar terms. The quotes
given are identiﬁed by the city and whether the speaker was male
(M) or female (F) and for those directly related to issues for which
prompts were given, whether the comment was made before or
after the prompt (pre-prompt, post-prompt).
The following sub-sections consider in turn four different
aspects of justice: the concept of ‘moral hazard’, the notion of
‘environmental dumping’, discussions around vested interests and
the idea of fair governance.
4.1. Mitigation deterrent or ‘Moral hazard’
First we examine discussion of the prospect that some
countries, groups or individuals may be motivated to reduce
mitigation by the actual or apparent availability of climate
engineering. Such a mitigation deterrent effect (Morrow, 2014)
or ‘trade-off’ between climate engineering and mitigation (Baatz,
2016) could be serious for climate justice. The side-effects or
uncertainties of climate engineering make it less able to reduce
climate injustice than mitigation. Moreover, insofar as it might
reduce the effort or expenditure on mitigation by those actors
understood to have caused climate change, climate engineering
reduces the extent to which mitigation delivers corrective justice.
Such mitigation deterrent can be described as a form of moral
hazard. There is substantial debate over the exact nature and
extent of the ‘moral hazard’ problem with respect to climate
engineering and the best terminology to describe it (Hale 2012; Lin,
2013; Reynolds 2014; Morrow, 2014; Moreno-Cruz, 2015; Baatz,
2016) but few if any scholars or commentators reject the existence
of the phenomenon.
Moral hazard can be inherently an issue of justice where the
outcome is a transfer of risk from those making the decision to
others. In the case of climate engineering, moral hazard typically
implies shifting climate risk onto those most vulnerable to climate
impacts, and especially onto future generations, by reducing or
delaying mitigation. In the following we use the term moral hazard
as a broad category encompassing a variety of logics for mitigation
deterrence, and present material that illustrates the plural and
inter-related public concerns in this respect. Understood in this
way, moral hazard featured in the group discussions on both CDR
and SRM approaches in statements such as the following:
“I think [geo-engineering] would act as a smoke screen . . . . it lulls
us all into a false sense of security.” M, Cardiff (pre-prompt)
“it could be a cop-out as well. For not doing things on a day-to-day
basis. Because it doesn’t matter, because ‘Hey, we’re going to take
all that from the sky and we’re going to put it into the ground in 50
years’ time, so where’s the problem? . . . [But] most geo
engineering technologies do not yet exist; will they exist?” M,
Cardiff (pre-prompt)
The potentially demotivating effect of climate engineering was
recognized by participants, and linked to uncertainty about its
practical deliverability, but not explicitly expressed as an issue of
inter-generational justice. However, in other ways, participants
expressed signiﬁcant concerns for future generations with respect
to both climate engineering and climate change more generally.
These arose both in cosmopolitan forms – of concern for generic
future people – and more communitarian terms – of concern for
children or grandchildren.
“I think it’s our responsibility, we’re only custodians, we’re only
here for a short period of time why should we ruin it for every
generation to come.” M, Cardiff
“now I’ve got three kids of my own I think completely differently
and it’s about creating a future for them.” M, Birmingham
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2013), future concerns framed in communitarian terms were
substantially more likely to be expressed by participants who at
some time in the session had identiﬁed themselves as parents than
by other participants.
The implication that moral hazard might be unfair to future
generations was perhaps taken for granted. But concepts of
fairness were more directly and explicitly mobilized in the second,
and more commonly raised dimension of moral hazard: that of
countries or groups using climate engineering as an excuse to
unfairly avoid or renege on commitments or obligations to
contribute to mitigation.
“you’re kind of closing the stable door after the horse has bolted
. . . if you had a system where you could deal with the carbon
dioxide and reduce it, would that though then give some of the
countries an excuse to just pour out more and more and more.” M,
Glasgow (pre-prompt)
“But it might make things worse. There might be then be new
technologies come out because people think, ‘Oh well, we’ve got
this, we’ve got this geo-engineering here and that’s going to ﬁx all
the problems so we can have extra planes or extra you know like
something new!” F, Glasgow (pre-prompt)
“if [geoengineering] was put in place then some countries would
use that as an excuse. They’d say ‘there you go, it’s in place, it’s
doing the job; we don’t have to worry about emissions and what
have you.”' F, Norwich (post-prompt)
Such obligations were seen by participants to arise not only on
the basis of principles of ‘the polluter pays’ or historical
responsibility, but on a broader sense of collective responsibility
to mitigate, so encompassed also developing countries and
emerging economies, as well as more ‘usual suspects’ like the
United States of America and Russia. Some participants actively
voiced concerns that it would be unfair to expect the UK to act if
other countries did not  a view that extended even to the conduct
of climate engineering where that was considered.
“I think what both of you two are exactly saying is that what’s the
point in us doing it [mitigation] if the whole rest of the world isn’t
going to do it.” M, Cardiff (pre-prompt)
“it’s good that everyone beneﬁts, but why should the UK just do all,
all this hard work [to develop geo-engineering], and no one else
bothers.” F, Glasgow (pre-prompt)
Amongst these publics, ‘I won’t if you don’t appear to be a
widely applied rule of thumb for fairness, with an implicit common
understanding that free-riding, or beneﬁting from something to
which one has not contributed, is unfair. Concerns identiﬁed under
this heading were often linked to support for a normative view that
climate engineering – even where it was considered attractive –
should not be permitted to reduce or replace mitigation activity:
“I think mitigation is the key to it, you know, you’ve got to start
somewhere and you start with mitigation and keep it going . . .
mitigation is deﬁnitely on the cards for keeps”. F, Glasgow (post-
prompt)
“Some research on this is sensible but [I] wouldn’t want this to take
money away from mitigation”. F, Norwich (post-prompt)
More recent research has distinguished a political moral hazard
from a personal form: in the former politicians, governments and
other organisations are seen as vulnerable to the temptation to
backslide on mitigation if climate engineering appears plausible,
while in the latter it is individuals who are affected. Corner and
Pidgeon (2014) suggest the former is both more likely and more
serious. Wibeck et al. (2015) suggest that concerns about political
moral hazard predominated in their focus groups. Our data
supports a similar interpretation. Participants raised concerns
about moral hazard in all groups, and with some exceptions mostparticipants saw it as a serious risk. Moreover, while they appeared
to distance themselves from the possibility that they personally
might reduce mitigation because of climate engineering, they
often expressed concerns that others, especially politicians, might
be tempted, echoing the public scepticism Capstick and Pidgeon
(2013) found regarding the political system’s capacity to deliver
effective climate policy.
“What I don’t like the idea of is that if measures come out to help us
in the medium and long term that people then make the decision
that sod it we won’t bother doing preventative measures . . .
we’ll just produce as much carbon as we like . . . ” M, Birmingham
(pre-prompt, following discussion of aerosol injection)
“I could see [politicians] kind of rushing in, ‘This is the saviour of the
planet and we’re going to put it into place.’ I mean I’m not just
talking about our government . . . ” F, Norwich (pre-prompt)
In one group, this fear of political moral hazard was illustrated
by an analogy with tobacco tax:
“ . . . they want people to quit smoking and the only way they’ll
stop it is to stop selling fags, simple as . . . then people can't smoke,
you know what I mean? So it’s the only way they’ll do it but they
won’t stop because they sell so much and they sell so well.” F
Cardiff
On the other hand, a few comments seemed to imply something
of a ‘negative’ moral hazard effect in which the risks and
shortcomings of climate engineering stimulate a greater commit-
ment to mitigation.
“[Actual geoengineering] would frighten people to death wouldn’t
it and it might get an internal reaction into talking about it and
actually getting politicians to make decisions and get things done.”
M Birmingham (pre-prompt, following discussion of aerosol
injection)
However on close reading of the transcripts most of the
comments implying an incentive to mitigate appear to refer more
generally to learning about the seriousness of climate change at the
event, and not explicitly to climate engineering.
“I mean it’s opened my eyes to how serious  ?I knew it was serious
but the fact that we’ve gone into this where we’re looking at
reﬂecting sunlight and you’re thinking, ‘Well it’s a bit closer than I
thought really.” F, Birmingham (pre-prompt)
We might also sound a note of caution regarding the
personal commitments expressed in such groups. Past experi-
ence with deliberation suggests that participants may express
ideas that are thought to be socially deviant by attributing them
to unspeciﬁed others. In this case we must recognise the
possibility that participants who in reality might be tempted to
avoid more inconvenient forms of mitigation (especially if
others were not doing them) – the social form of moral hazard
identiﬁed by Corner and Pidgeon (2014) – could be loathe to
admit that in a group setting discussing responses to serious
climate change, but might well rather express it as something
‘others’ might do.
Nonetheless, like many climate engineering scholars, these
publics clearly identify and fear the prospect of moral hazard.
However, they interpret it as an issue of justice more in terms of
free-riding than as an unjust transfer of risk. This perhaps
strengthens concerns that free-riding might justify a fear of moral
hazard (Hale, 2012); or contribute as a strategic deterrent to
mitigation from an economic theory perspective (Moreno-Cruz,
2015). Avoiding moral hazard raises serious governance challenges
(as previously highlighted by Parkhill et al., 2013), for instance:
how to ensure that resources allocated to mitigation (including
such diverse things as research budgets and parliamentary time)
are not diverted, or that arguments for lowered effort on mitigation
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4.2. Distributed impacts: environmental dumping
In modern Western society, questions of justice often focus
upon the distribution of harms and beneﬁts. Participants raised
distributive concerns but in unexpected ways. Although the
uneven or unfair distribution of climatic effects, such as changes
in rainfall patterns arising from climate engineering, is the main
way in which climate scientists have engaged with justice
concerns, it did not feature strongly in the discussions. This is
perhaps more because the distributed nature of such implications
is not immediately obvious when climate engineering is presented
as a response to climate change designed to ameliorate the rise in
global temperatures, rather than a lack of concern for groups or
nations vulnerable to such effects. However, and somewhat
unexpectedly, participants typically swiftly identiﬁed the possi-
bility of unfairly distributed impacts from CDR techniques,
drawing analogies with the dumping of undesirable wastes (or
polluting processes) on poorer populations, particularly in
developing nations. Such concerns arose with respect to both
biochar and direct air capture.
“But I can just imagine that’s what they’ll do. So they get all the CO2
and then, what, give it to a poorer country? So dig a hole, we’ll give
you a couple of million . . . ” F, Glasgow
“if it’s lucrative for companies to be involved in it, they’ll always do
what they can for the countries that have got money . . . and
you’ll end up with the less developed countries being used as the
dumping grounds . . . because that’s how they’ll make the
money.” M, Glasgow
Participant 1: “we haven’t got the land to place them on but we
could produce [geoengineering technologies]. . . .
Participant 2: ‘Yeah but then we’d send it to some poor country like
we send all our rubbish . . . you know all the stuff that we can’t
recycle it all goes off to India or China or somewhere and it’s
dumped there.’ Discussion, Birmingham
The phenomenon of environmental dumping is widely
discussed in the environmental justice literature especially in
the USA where research suggests that communities of colour are
disproportionately exposed to environmental hazards, and insti-
tutionalized racism is seen as a contributing factor (Bullard, 1990;
Shrader-Frechette, 2002; Walker, 2012). However, it has not
previously featured strongly in policy and public discourse in
the UK, despite efforts by some UK NGOs such as Friends of the
Earth and the Environmental Justice Foundation to highlight such
problems, so the prevalence of this frame was unexpected.
The focus on CDR perhaps reﬂects a greater tangibility of
concerns over the risks of carbon storage, which were raised as a
particular future uncertainty (a risk distributed over time as well as
space), and primarily, though not exclusively with reference to
direct air capture approaches.
“I don’t like the idea of like carbon dioxide could be stored
underground or in the ocean, so you’re just creating problems for
the future for that.” F, Birmingham
“what’s the effect of storing it underground and what are the
effects of storing it in the ocean (murmurs of agreement) because
I’d really like to know what impact it actually has . . . Is it a ticking
time bomb?” M, Birmingham
“Well, what damage are the chemicals going to do if it’s going to
remove the carbon? And when would they ﬁnd that out? And then
just like we were all saying earlier, if it could be in another 150years people are like ‘Why did they do that?’ because this has now
caused another problem.” F, Glasgow
Although concerns about storage also appear in deliberation
about carbon capture and storage (CCS) related to energy
technology (Butler et al., 2013), it does not appear that greater
familiarity with carbon storage (in comparison with unfamiliarity
with SRM) was the cause of concern here, as only one or two
participants expressed any awareness of carbon capture and
storage proposals associated with power plants in the UK. It was
however noticeable that terms such as ‘chemical’ or ‘gas’ raised
concerns more generally (not only because particular groups or
communities might be exposed to them), perhaps reﬂecting their
status as everyday risks in domestic and wider settings.
“You see that’s what I was thinking I’m thinking like gas because
gas like gas in the cooker that can then explode, that’s why I’m
not sure what could that then explode and you’d think, ‘Oh my
God, there’d be gas everywhere and . . . ’ do you see what I
mean?” F, Norwich
“Especially when we came up with the thing about geo-
engineering, using chemicals, you know, as a solution. Chemicals
. . . don’t sound very good, you know”. F, Glasgow
This area offers a good illustration of the complex processes by
which publics mobilize existing analogues and concepts to ‘make
sense’ of a new and unfamiliar topic (Marcu et al., 2015; Wibeck
et al., 2015), and in turn expose underlying values and principles.
Such concerns also indicate that with more comprehensive initial
information about the mechanisms and distributed implications of
solar radiation management, the prospect of its negative localized
side-effects being ‘dumped’ on the poor and powerless might
equally be expected to raise public concerns, albeit involving
different analogues.
Worries about the threat of environmental dumping did not
however rely on an explicit link to concerns about the unfair
distribution of power. In these engagement events, only a minority
of those concerned about the excess inﬂuence of the rich and
powerful made such a connection. Yet suspicion of vested interests
was widespread (as we outline in the next section), and we suggest
that this is another example where the underlying connection was
effectively ‘taken for granted’.
4.3. Suspicion of vested interests
The transcripts largely reveal conceptions of justice that are
rooted in real-world context and experience, rather than in
abstract justice theories (or in perceived characteristics of the
climate engineering techniques considered). For instance, partic-
ipants in all the groups expressed concerns about the inﬂuence of
the rich and powerful on decision-making, and about the
implications of corporate involvement and the proﬁt-motive for
climate engineering, often citing past experience and what we
might describe as ‘commonplace knowledge’ about how society
works. In other words, echoing Parkhill et al.’s ﬁndings (2013) of
public support for innovation coupled with fears that commercial
interests might override the good intentions of scientists, our
participants were concerned that climate engineering, like other
responses to climate change, might be driven by vested interests
rather than by scientiﬁc assessment of the climate problem.
“you get to know that whatever you say, whatever you think, isn’t
going to make the slightest bit of difference because you’re in the
hands of politicians and big business and if people are making a lot
of money they don’t care if they’re polluting the planet.” M,
Norwich
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permission; they can’t just decide to start doing it . . .
Participant 2: ‘Well, I dispute that. I think they can decide what
they want, because at the end of the day they’ve got access to
people in power’. Discussion, Cardiff
The prospect that companies perceived to have proﬁted from
climate change might subsequently proﬁt from climate engineer-
ing appeared to be felt as especially unfair. This perhaps indicates
underlying corrective or even retributive conceptions of justice,
which would call for those beneﬁting from past harms to pay
compensation or even be punished rather than further rewarded
(Farber, 2008; Walen, 2014):
“You just mentioned [commercial oil company] there, ﬁrst they’re
going to make mega millions producing oil and stripping the world
resources and now they’re going to make mega millions, protecting
it, you know, it’s going to be the same companies that are doing it.”
M, Glasgow (with reference to direct air capture)
“So my biggest fear around all of this is if a private corporation was
to develop . . . it only looking at the ﬁnancial gains and all the
trappings that come with that? Or is this about, ‘well you know
what, we’ve made tons of money out of what we’ve done in the
past; we’ve dug for oil, we’ve found whatever, whatever and we’ve
made absolutely shed loads of money. Now we’re in a position
where we’re having a huge impact on our overall environment
here’s what we’re going to put back in terms of our proﬁts from
previous years into developing ideas and what we’re going to do
with those ideas is share them.’ If those companies or those entities
were to be saying that I’d be saying . . . yeah power to them let
them go ahead and develop. But we all know sitting here if a private
corporation goes ahead and develops it’s about monetary return.”
M, Birmingham
Signiﬁcantly, some participants endorsed a view that climate
engineering should not be ‘for-proﬁt’ at all. Even amongst those
who apparently accepted for-proﬁt climate engineering in line
with a standard, understood model of progress in which
commercial interests advance and develop applications of science,
such acceptance was typically grudging.
“I have to say, anyone who’s going to be doing it for money, and if a
proﬁt can be done on to it, they should not be involved in it
whatsoever.” M, Glasgow
“Trust more in organisations who don’t have a hidden agenda, for
example, Greenpeace, rather than proﬁt-driven companies . . . So
anyone making money on it, you know, or we don’t know but we’d
assume that, you know, that’s what their target’s going to be,
making money, and they can cover facts, hide certain things,
whereas . . . a non-proﬁt organisation [would] be in it for the
better interest and it’s not just to make money and, you know,
cover corners or cut costs or whatever, it’s, they’ve got good
intentions, basically.” M, Glasgow
However, in some cases commercial involvement was de-
scribed as the ‘lesser of two evils’ compared with taxpayer funding,
which was seen as unlikely under current economic conditions.
“in the economic climate we’re in, it’s kind of the lesser of the two
evils. that it’s funded by people like that [companies], which may
mean that the decisions are in privileged hands, but what’s the
other alternative? To take more public money that we don’t have.”
F, Norwich
Strong conceptions of procedural justice may underlie the deep
suspicions of vested interests expressed here. If widely replicated,
such views could have serious implications for the design of
appropriate governance and incentives should climate engineering
be pursued (and we turn to these issues next).4.4. Fair and responsible governance
Participants also engaged with other procedural aspects of
justice, suggesting forms of governance that were seen to be fair
and responsible, to be applied to any climate engineering
technique. Much of this discussion was seemingly motivated by
the perception of excessive inﬂuence by vested interests (in both
research and potential deployment), and by concerns about the
dominant role of certain countries in international climate
governance.
“Which is always the same story, it’s always the rich countries that
decide in the long run. So ones that have got money and they can
put it in, it’s . . . their say, it really is.” F, Glasgow (post-prompt)
Some participants feared such narrow decision making,
although many felt it to be inevitable. Nonetheless a prevalent
suggestion was that some form of multilateral, democratic and
consensual decision making process for climate engineering would
be needed  both at research and deployment stages.
“I mean you vote for governments why couldn’t you ask everybody
to, okay right well we’ll tell you about this or what we’re intending,
have a universal vote?” F, Birmingham (pre-prompt)
“I mean if our country say, for example, our country came up with
an idea then surely they just wouldn’t do that without consulting
other countries as well?” F, Birmingham (post-prompt)
“the United Nations has 193 members, you know, and it’s your
whole . . . it covers the whole globe so why can’t it be managed by
somebody like the United Nations? Not necessarily for proﬁt.” M,
Cardiff (pre-prompt)
These ﬁndings echo and help elaborate those of Wibeck et al.
(2015), Bellamy et al. (2014), Pidgeon et al. (2013) and Macnaghten
and Szerszynski (2012), where participants called for effective
governance and oversight. Here we also ﬁnd support for particular
tools of procedural justice, notably participation and transparency.
In addition education was generally advocated, both as a
foundation for better decision-making and for justice, in any
response to climate change.
Participant 1: “If there’s no money to be made it’s about full
disclosure isn’t it? Because it doesn’t beneﬁt them to hold back on
anything. . . .
Participant 2: “Would you want them to know about that they’re
even working on the idea?
Participant 1: “Yeah of course why not? The UN should be involved
in it anyway because it’s the whole earth isn’t it and it’s global.”
Discussion, Birmingham (post-prompt)
“I think yeah we all should really . . . Not just the rich and . . . I
think everyone should have a say.” F, Cardiff (post-prompt)
“I think it will come down to education and information, that you
need to say to folk, ‘Right, if you don’t want to [protect the climate]
for you, do it for your grandchildren and their children.” F, Glasgow
(post-prompt)
Such discussions of governance suggest that publics share
concerns raised by scholars and ethicists that climate engineering
governance would be extremely challenging if at all practical (e.g.
Hulme, 2014; Hamilton, 2013; Rayner et al., 2013); that fair and
responsible decision making in respect of climate engineering
would require multi-scalar governance, and that without trans-
parency and ongoing assessment, neither companies, nor politi-
cians nor even scientists could be expected to act consistently in
line with public interests.
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This section ﬁrst summarizes the extent to which justice issues
were expressed in the dialogues, and the forms this took. It then
discusses the signiﬁcance of the publics’ expressions of justice
issues, and the possible conceptions that underlie them.
Justice issues appear consistently and repeatedly across the all
of the discussions regarding the climate engineering technologies
in the dialogues. Further, they appear in a rich diversity of forms
and conceptions (albeit often subtle or even implicit and taken for
granted, rather than explicit). However, the extent to which these
public expressions directly reﬂect the distributional and utilitarian
justice conceptions found in the scientiﬁc literature is negligible.
There is more congruence with concerns for future generations and
over moral corruption, raised by philosophers such as Gardiner
(2010), and with concerns raised by social movements and
environmental justice scholars such as Schlosberg (2007). Publics
echoed both speciﬁc concerns highlighted in environmental
justice, such as environmental dumping – which can be
interpreted as a concern that poorer countries and groups are
not afforded the same rights, protections and even recognition as
rich communities – and the inherent diversity of environmental
justice concepts rooted in the justice claims of social and
environmental movements. Overall, issues rooted in lived experi-
ence, with concerns about power and procedure to the fore, appear
more salient (if not necessarily of more concern) than more
academic concerns such as the patterning of the impacts of
engineered climates across space and time.
Capstick et al. (2015) note that, with respect to climate change,
“people’s understanding is culturally-embedded, and situated
within broader conversations concerning such things as morality,
justice, responsibility and trust” (p4). In this analysis we have
found views on climate engineering that follow similar patterns.
Justice issues are not typically the ﬁrst or most frequent concerns
raised by publics regarding climate engineering, but they are
clearly relevant and appear to inﬂuence opinions whether
implicitly or explicitly. Each of the issues highlighted above
featured in at least three of the four dialogues, in every case raised
or endorsed in some way by between a third and a half of
participants. This is comparable with the proportion of the
participants expressing concerns (discussed by Corner et al.,
2013) about ‘messing with nature’ or the likely side-effects of
climate engineering.
In these dialogues, as might be expected, justice concerns were
expressed in context, reﬂecting established understandings of
economic priorities, distributional politics and vested interests.
This suggests that climate engineering is probably not being seen
as inherently unjust because of any apparent essential character-
istics of any of the speciﬁc technologies, but potentially unjust in
the common ways the technologies might be deployed and
governed, and the interests they could be expected to serve. In this
respect, the ﬁndings therefore broadly support a view that climate
engineering might achieve the form of conditional acceptance that
has marked mitigation technologies such as nuclear power, and
carbon capture and storage, as suggested by Corner and Pidgeon
(2010). Like these technologies climate engineering is likely to
stimulate continued demands for strong tools of procedural
justice. Yet with the contextual and technological richness and
diversity of climate engineering, such potential reluctant ‘con-
ditonality’ has many possible dimensions, and arguably, at least for
certain SRM technologies, might even prove impossible to obtain
within a democratic system (Szerszynski et al., 2013). Nonetheless,
the expectation that in many guises it could – and probably would
– reproduce the privilege of the rich and powerful (which is in turn
understood as unfair), is likely to be shared widely enough to
inﬂuence its political acceptability. Again, as in the cases of nuclearpower and CCS, such reactions might help sustain widespread
public suspicion or even resistance in many countries, raising
particular concerns about climate engineering approaches with
global impacts.
In the cases of CCS and nuclear, a key factor in conditional
acceptance appears to be their integration into a coherent
narrative of effective climate response (Butler et al., 2013). For
instance when CCS is seen as somehow providing an alternative to,
or slowing the progress of, decarbonization, opposition is more
marked. This matches broadly with the way moral hazard concerns
over climate engineering were expressed as a normative impera-
tive in the dialogues reported here. Publics were clearly opposed to
climate engineering being deployed as an alternative to decarbon-
ization, but may be more sympathetic to its use within a coherent
climate response package.
6. Conclusion
Carbon dioxide removal forms of climate engineering are
already prevalent in scientiﬁc and political scenarios for limiting
climate change to below a 2 C global rise in temperature, and the
aspirational goal agreed in Paris to work towards no more than
1.5 C seems likely to also trigger renewed advocacy for consider-
ation of solar radiation management. The role of justice in the
formation of attitudes to climate engineering cannot be over-
looked, any more than in other areas of climate policy. The
expressions and conceptions of justice found in this study are
complex and manifold, including international, intergenerational,
distributional and procedural concepts. More detailed under-
standing would require carefully designed further deliberation,
and continued efforts to unframe existing assumptions about
climate engineering. The complexity revealed here suggests that
politicians and researchers should remain wary of making
simplistic claims about justice to try to promote a particular view
on climate engineering or a particular form or technology. It is
reasonable to explore the possibility that SRM might offer
particular beneﬁts to those most vulnerable to the impacts of
climate change, as Keith (2013) for example, argues. But the overall
implications for justice will depend on many other social, political
and cultural factors as well as on the interrelated technological
capabilities that emerge. The justice concerns we have identiﬁed
were largely expressed as of general application to all the
technologies discussed, although some of the implications of
environmental dumping were clearly more directly applied to CDR
methods. These ﬁndings suggest that efforts to redeﬁne CDR as
distinct from other climate engineering approaches would not
reduce the breadth of governance challenges arising from demands
for justice.
Moreover, these ﬁndings remind us that justice concerns are
not only, or even primarily, the domain of academics and
philosophers. Publics are engaged with the construction and
understanding of justice and this paper has illustrated some of the
dimensions they will use to judge or hold accountable those who
bring climate engineering into being. Politicians and scientists will
be at the sharp edge of procedures to determine the role – if any –
for climate engineering within climate policy, and the design of
mechanisms or institutions that might subsequently deliver it.
Those procedures, mechanisms and institutions will not be
developed in a vacuum: the attitudes of the relevant societies to
inequality and mechanisms that produce and reproduce it over
space and through time will inevitably inﬂuence the politics and
practices of climate engineering research and development, just as
much as the speciﬁc modalities and expressions of those politics
and practices could reshape attitudes. Researchers and policy
makers need to expand their climate engineering ‘imaginaries’ to
include a better representation of publics and their justice
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systems and appraisals.
The evidence presented above suggests that perceptions of
implications for justice, the nature of those involved in develop-
ment and deployment, the incentives and safeguards they face, and
the procedural mechanisms applied with respect to transparency,
participation and accountability will all inﬂuence public reactions.
More detailed – and internationally replicated – public engage-
ment on climate engineering and its justice implications would
appear essential if sound, well-informed and morally justiﬁable
decisions are to be made regarding research or development of
climate engineering.
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